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Abstract 
In the last decades Latin American countries, and very much related to the  
implementation of macroeconomic reforms, have seen a convergence in 
economic policy  making, design, tool kits and objectives. This 
convergence has been rather generalized in the region with few 
exceptions. The paper explores the reasons why this convergene has not 
been reflected in a similar way on their economic performances. It pays 
special attention to the role played by institutional factors and by 
government policies in explaining the diversity in growth performance.  
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I. Policy and institutional 
convergence and divergent 
growth outcomes 
A. Economic and political reforms since the 
debt crisis: Institutional and policy 
convergence 
In the first decades of the postwar period, Latin America embraced a 
paradigm that placed the Developmental State at the center of the strategy, 
with industrialization, which was regarded at the time as critical to 
increase living standards, as the major objective. Over the past 30 years 
Latin America has experienced a major overhaul in economic policies and 
institutions as well as in political institutions. As a result, a “great 
transformation” has taken place, if we may appropriate Karl Polanyi’s 
expression for events of a different scale. 
The major policy changes include far-reaching programs of 
economic reforms in different areas that gave a larger role to the private 
sector in the allocation of resources and greater scope to market forces 
and international competition, all this with the goal of entering a phase of 
strong export-led economic expansion. It is worth recalling what has 
happened. During and after the adjustment process to the debt crisis of  
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1982, monetary and fiscal policies were radically transformed. In 1980, in a group of 20 Latin American 
countries, 1 none had an independent Central Bank. By 2012, a majority of countries (11) had an 
independent Central Bank. In addition in the largest countries (Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, and 
Peru) the central bank operated under an inflation targeting regime with a floating exchange rate and 
price stability as its sole mandate. 2 Fiscal policy went through a similar overhaul. In 1980 no country 
had a balanced budget rule. By 2012, 8 countries had a balanced budget law, generally a strict 
commitment to balance the budget every year with the exception of Chile which had a structural budget 
rule which allowed for fiscal deficits during recessions provided that these were compensated by budget 
surpluses in boom periods (see table 1). 
TABLE 1 
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND FISCAL RULES, 2012 
Country Central Bank independence Fiscal rule 
Brazil Yes, since 1988 a B. B. since 2000 
Chile Yes, since 1989 Structural budget since 2000 
El Salvador Yes, since 1991 N. R. 
Colombia Yes, since 1992 B. B. since 1997 
Honduras Yes, since 1993 N. R. 
Mexico Yes, since 1993 B. B. since 2006 
Peru Yes, since 1993 B. B. since 1999 
Paraguay Yes, since 1995 N. R. 
Uruguay Yes, since 1995 N. R. 
Ecuador Yes, since 2002 B. B. since 2003 
Guatemala Yes, since 2002 N. R. 
Argentina Yes from 1992 to 2012 B. B. since 2000 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) No N. R. 
Costa Rica No N. R. 
Cuba No N. R. 
Dominican Republic No N. R. 
Haiti No N. R. 
Nicaragua No N. R. 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) No N. R. 
Panama No Central Bank B. B. since 2002 
Sources: IMF, Cottarelli (2009), Jácome and Vázques (2005) and Central Bank websites.  
a      Not formally independent but operates autonomously since 1988. 
N. R. = No fiscal rule. 
B. B. = Balanced budget. 
Regarding structural reforms in other areas, the early and prominent components of the reform 
agenda were trade liberalization and deeper integration into the world economy based on comparative 
advantages, as well as a broad opening to foreign direct investment. As shown in table 2, tariffs were 
sharply reduced and the tariff structure radically simplified as non-tariff barriers were largely eliminated. 
                                                        
1  This group of 20 countries includes those Latin American countries for which information is available in the Penn World Table. 
Table 1 shows these 20 countries. 
2  Inflation targeting regimes now prevail in major Latin American countries. Chile and Colombia were the pioneers having adopted 
inflation targets since 1990 and 1991 respectively. Peru introduced a floating exchange rate regime in 1994 and in 2002 the central 
bank replaced quantitative targets for monetary aggregates with inflation targets using the interest rate as the main instrument of 
monetary policy. After the 1994-1995 crisis, Mexico let the peso float and in 1999 moved to an inflation targeting regime eventually 
adopting a target interest rate as policy instrument. Brazil also joined this group of countries in 1999 after the exchange rate crisis of 
the beginning of that year. 
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The median average tariff which in 1985 was 42% fell to 5% in 2010 and the highest average tariff went 
down from 88% to 11%. These changes were so far-reaching that, as argued in Ocampo and Ros (2011), 
the objective of setting low tariffs was achieved to a much greater extent than in the classical period of 
primary export-led growth in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. 
TABLE 2 
OPENNESS TO INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT, 1985-2010 
Average tariff (%) a 1985 2010 
Median average tariff 42 5 
Highest average tariff 88 b (Dominican Republic) 11 Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 
Lowest average tariff 20 (Bolivia, Plurinational State 
of) 
2 (C. Rica a and Nicaragua) 
   
Foreign trade as % of GDP b 1980 2008 
Median value 54.3 64.4 
Highest value 177.9 (Panama) 156.5 (Panama) 
Lowest value 11.5 (Argentina) 24.2 (Brasil) 
   
FDI as % of total investment 1980 2009 
Median value 4 13 
Highest value 30 (Panama c) 37 (Chile) 
Lowest value 0 (Cuba and Venezuela, 
Bolivarian Republic of) 
-4 (Venezuela, Bolivarian 
Republic of)) 
Sources: For tariffs: Lora (2001), World Development Indicators. For Foreign trade: PWT. 
For FDI: UNCTADSTAT. 
a     Weighted mean to all products (%). 
b     Openness at 2005 constant prices (%). 
c     2009 d: 1988 e: 1981. 
A wave of FTAs or custom unions took place with NAFTA (1994) in the North and MERCOSUR 
(1991) in the South being the most important initiatives. Moreover, under the leadership of Mexico and 
Chile, a wave of bilateral or multilateral free trade agreements was launched. All this contributed to a 
sharp increase in the weight of international trade in the economy. As shown in table 2, the share of 
exports and imports in GDP increased for the median country from 54.3% to 64.4%. Some spectacular 
increases were recorded by Argentina (from 11.5% to 45.1%), Mexico (from 28.4% to 58.8%), 
Costa Rica (from 56.9% to 100.8%), and Paraguay (from 47.4% to 105.9%) (see table A.2 in Appendix). 
In turn, the relaxation of FDI regulations led to a sharp increase in the share of FDI in gross capital 
formation. The median country increased this share from 4% to 13% (see table 2) and for some countries 
this share rose to over 30% (table A.3 in Annex). 
Trade and FDI liberalization were accompanied, in addition, by the elimination of exchange 
controls and domestic financial liberalization. The latter included the liberalization of interest rates, the 
elimination of most forms of directed credit, and the reduction and simplification of reserve 
requirements on bank deposits. Although it was also accepted that financial liberalization required 
regulation to avoid the accumulation of excessive risks in the financial system, the full acceptance of the 
need for regulation only came after a fair number of domestic financial crises (in particular the Tequila 
crisis of 1994-1995). 
Another component in the agenda of structural reforms was the privatization of a large set of 
public enterprises together with the opening to private investment of public services and utilities sectors. 
The more general deregulation of private economic activities was also part of the agenda. The 
privatization process was more gradual than in the case of trade liberalization and a number of countries 
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kept public sector banks and a number of other firms, notably in oil and infrastructure services (water 
and sewage more than electricity and telecommunications).  
There was, finally, an agenda of at least partial liberalization of labor markets, but here political 
factors limited the scope the reform proposals (Murillo and others, 2010). Even then, as many as 13 
countries in our group of 20 undertook changes in labor market regulations with the aim of making the 
labor market more flexible (see table 3). 
TABLE 3 
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: LABOUR MARKET REFORMS, 1984-1999 
Country  
Haiti Yes (1984) 
Brazil Yes (1985) 
Colombia Yes (1990) 
Guatemala Yes (1990) 
Argentina Yes (1991) 
Peru Yes (1991) 
Dominican Republic Yes (1992) 
Paraguay Yes (1993) 
El Salvador Yes (1994) 
Chile Yes (1995) 
Panama Yes (1995) 
Nicaragua Yes (1996) 
Ecuador Yes (1997) 
Venezuela ((Bolivarian Republic of) Yes (1999) 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) No 





Source: Vega (2005); Lora y Pagés (1996) and NATLEX, International Labor  
Organization. Implementation year in parentheses. 
Changes in political regimes went hand in hand with economic liberalization. Following 
Przeworski (2004) criteria to classify a political regime as authoritarian or democratic, table A.4 in the 
Annex shows that in 1980 there were only four countries (Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and 
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of) with democratic political regimes so that 85.1% of the population of 
the 20 Latin American countries lived under authoritarian regimes. In 2009, only one country (Cuba) 
continued to be authoritarian, representing 2% of the total population. 
Moreover, perceptions about the rule of law in Latin America, available for 1996 to 2010 from 
Worldwide Government Indicators (WGI), show a steady improvement since 1996. The percentile rank 
of Latin American countries improved from 1996 to 2009 (see table 4), with only 6 exceptions 
(Argentina, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Ecuador Nicaragua, Paraguay and Venezuela, Bolivarian 
Republic of) plus a minor fall for highly ranked Costa Rica. 
CEPAL - Serie Estudios y perspectivas - México - N° 139 Institutional and policy convergence with growth divergence in… 
11 
TABLE 4 
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: PERCENTILE RANK FOR RUE OF  
LAW INDICATOR, 1996 AND  2009 
Country 1996 2009 Change 
Chile 85 87 +2 
Uruguay 65 70 +5 
Costa Rica 68 65 -3 
Panama 49 51 +2 
Brazil 40 50 +10 
Colombia 20 41 +21 
Dominican Republic 41 48 +9 
Mexico 30 35 +5 
Cuba 18 35 +17 
Argentina 55 30  -25 
Peru 30 30 0 
El Salvador 20 22 +2 
Nicaragua 35 22 -13 
Honduras 20 20 0 
Paraguay 21 19 -2 
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) 
47 13 -34 
Guatemala 12 13 +1 
Ecuador 36 10 -26 




20 2 -18 
Source: Worldwide Government Indicators (WGI). The WGI are 
produced by: Daniel Kaufmann, Brookings Institution, Aart Kraay, 
World Bank Development Research Group, Massimo Mastruzzi, 
World Bank Institute. 
B. An initial comparison with the period of state led 
industrialization 
The economic growth performance of Latin America since the 1980s is clearly weaker than that of the 
previous development phase. This is true even if we leave aside the “lost decade” of the 1980s. For the 
period 1990-2008, the average of Latin America’s per capita GDP growth rate has been 1.8% per year, 
well below the growth rate of the period 1950-1980 (2.7%) and less than the average growth rate of the 
world economy. The growth performance of GDP per worker, a gross measure of productivity, is even 
worse: 0.7% per year for 1990-2008 vs. 2.7% in 1950-1980. This means that most of the increase in 
GDP per capita since 1990 has been the result of the demograph bonus resulting from the slowdown of 
population growth (from 2.7% to 1.5%) in the face of a still relatively fast growth of the labor force 
(2.6% per year, a rate similar to the 2.8% of 1950-1980) (see Ros, 2009).  
Table 5 indicates that only a few countries have experienced a dynamic growth of productivity at 
rates above 2% per year since 1990. Only 4 out of 19 countries (Dominican Republic, Peru, Chile and 
Uruguay), had a better growth performance than in the period 1950-1980 while at the same time having 
an equal or faster growth than the United States for 1990-2008. Most countries recorded growth rates 
below that of the US and a poorer growth performance in 1990-2008 than in 1950-1980. This poor 
overall productivity performance is not due to the absence of new dynamic and highly productive 
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activities; it is rather the reflection of the rising share of low-productivity informal activities, as the 
dynamic highly productive sectors were unable to absorb a larger share of the labor force (Ros, 2011). 
TABLE 5 
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: GROWTH PERFORMANCE, 1990-2008 
(Relative to 1950-1980) 
  Above Below 
Relative 






















 Argentina (1.7) 
Honduras (1.5) 










Republic of) (-0.2) 
Haiti (-1.1) 
Source: WDI and Maddison (2007, 2009). 
In parentheses, growth rates (1990-2008) of GDP per person employed. Countries in italics show 
GDP per capita growth rate since for these countries GDP per person employed is not available. 
It is worth noting that, when looking across countries, there is no apparent relationship between 
the degree and timing of market liberalization and growth performance. The countries in the northwest 
box with two of the best performances are Chile, an early reformer, and the Dominican Republic, a late 
reformer. Interestingly, these two countries have also two very different macroeconomic frameworks: 
while Chile has an independent central bank and a structural balanced budget rule, the 
Dominican Republic has none of this (see table 1). Interestingly, all of the fast growing economies under 
State-led industrialization, with thoroughly liberalized economies, have now underperformed in relation 
to the past and the Unites Sates, with the major exceptions of the Dominican Republic and Panama. It 
also worth noting that this economic performance was affected not only by the poor results of the market 
reforms but also by worldwide macroeconomic turbulence. The collapse of growth during the lost 
decade of the 1980s was followed by a recovery in 1990-1997, although at a slower pace than during the 
years of State-led industrialization, and then by the “lost half decade” of 1998-2003. As a result, the 
relative position of Latin America in the world economy went back in 2003 to the levels of 1900! (see 
Ocampo and Ros, 2011). The combination of a new surge in external financing, the emergence of China 
as a new major purchaser of raw materials, and the increase in commodity prices, which had been absent 
since the 1970s, generated a new boom in 2004-2007, at a pace that was then more similar to that of the 
1970s. The global crisis in 2008-2009 suddenly interrupted the recovery after 2003, bringing about a 
deep recession in 2009, second only to that of Central and Eastern Europe, among the emerging and 
developing countries.  
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C. Causes of slow growth: Bad governments or good 
governments with bad policies? 
The factors explaining why some Latin American countries benefited more than others from the policy 
and institutional changes are to a large extent idiosyncratic. I will return below to this question. There 
were nevertheless some common factors behind the generalized failure to accelerate growth in the 
region, compared to the historical performance in 1950-1980. One such factor was a wrong diagnosis of 
the debt crisis. The reform overhaul was rooted in many policymakers’ view that the 1982 debt crisis 
was the unavoidable consequence of the years of trade protectionism and heavy state intervention that 
had marked —and in their view distorted— Latin America’s development during the postwar period. 
Thus, this crisis, which started with the Mexican moratorium of August 1982, was taken to be a crisis of 
the whole post war strategy of State-led industrialization. In fact, this was simply wrong. In countries 
with a large public external debt, such as Brazil and Mexico, the source of the problem was 
unsustainable macroeconomic policies, in particular fiscal policy, which led to a debt crisis (like today’s 
European debt crisis) when the creditor banks realized that Mexico, facing a decline in oil prices since 
the beginning of 1981 and higher interest rates as a result of the tight monetary policy in the 
United States (the Volcker shock), would not be able to repay the debt. The same perceptions were then 
extended to the rest of Latin America. It is ironic that the diagnosis was most clearly contradicted by the 
problems of the Southern cone (Chile, Argentina and Uruguay) which had abandoned import 
substitution and embarked in a path of economic liberalization since the mid 1970s and suffered a crisis 
in the early 1980s, not as a result of large fiscal deficits, but rather of increasing problems in their 
banking sectors and a rapid expansion of private external debt very much like the one that preceded the 
Tequila crisis of 1994-1995. 
There were also problems of implementation coupled with an excessive optimistic view of the 
potential of structural reforms to trigger a resumption of growth. Trade liberalization, for example, was 
seen as a sufficient condition for export-led growth and was not accompanied by a depreciation of the real 
exchange rate as had been recommended by the advocates of export led growth such as Balassa and 
Baghwati, as well as, in fact, Williamson’s Decalogue (where a competitive exchange rate was part of the 
10 point program). Similarly, financial liberalization as it was undertaken proved a disaster leading 
eventually to the Tequila crisis. This was because the lessons from the Southern cone financial crisis of the 
early 1980s (that were analyzed by Diaz-Alejandro and Frenkel in the early 1980s) were simply not learnt. 
The most important point to make here is that the slow down in growth took place in the midst of 
positive institutional changes, including, as already emphasized, changes in the direction of so called 
inclusive political and economic institutions (democracy, the rule of law, and economic liberalization, 
see Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). The failure to accelerate growth cannot be blamed on bad 
governments. It has to be the result of bad policies undertaken by good governments. 
What were the policy failures? There were several but let me focus on one. As graph 1 shows there 
is a correlation between growth of GDP per person employed and the investment rate (as a fraction of 
GDP). The correlation is not close due to idiosyncratic factors, but it is clearly positive. Countries that 
managed to invest more tended to grow faster than the rest. These investment rates fell in virtually all Latin 
American countries as a result of the fiscal adjustments that followed the debt crisis of 1982, adjustments 
that brought about a collapse of public investment almost everywhere (see graph 2). In some countries the 
low levels of public investment persisted after the recovery of the 1990s. In others, public investment 
recovered. As can be seen in figure 2, the key and striking difference between those in which GDP per 
person employed grew above 1.8% per year (the US rate), such as Panama, Peru and Uruguay, and those 
CEPAL - Serie Estudios y perspectivas - México - N° 139 Institutional and policy convergence with growth divergence in… 
14 
that failed to do so is that the first tended to recover the levels of public investment pre-debt crisis while 
most of the second did not. 3 This is bad policy not a manifestation of bad institutions. 
GRAPH 1 





























0 5 10 15 20 25 30
g
I  
Sources: The data on investment for Argentina and Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of), the data is from CEPALSTAT, Economic Comission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean. For the rest of the countries the date is from 
World Developtment Indicators, World Bank. The GDP anual average  
growth rates are from the World Development Indicators. 
GRAPH 2 
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: PUBLIC INVESTMENT AS % OF GDP 
Honduras Panama Peru Ecuador Costa Rica Argentina Mexico Uruguay Venezuela Brazil El Salvador
IG80 IG90 IG08 g*(1990-2008)  
Sources: IG. For Argentina and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), the data is from 
CEPALSTAT, United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean. For the rest of the countries the date is from World Development Indicators, 
World Bank. 
g*: Labour productivity growth rate; IG: Public investment as % of GDP. 
                                                        
3  The recovery of public investment was not, however, a sufficient condition (see Ecuador, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil). 
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II. The role of industrial policy and 
macroeconomic reform 
Trade liberalization was accompanied by the dismantling of state 
intervention in productive development that characterized the previous 
period, not only in the manufacturing sector but also in agricultural 
development. This vision was succinctly summarized by a lemma that was 
repeated in several contexts: “the best industrial policy is not to have an 
industrial policy”. In the application of this precept, technology policy, on 
which little progress had been made in the previous development phase 
(except, perhaps, in some agricultural research institutions), was also set 
aside, despite the fact that this is an element of intervention around which 
there is greater consensus. Trade liberalization and the dismantling of 
productive development policies was based on a number of arguments: 
the negative effects of protection on static efficiency (by moving the 
economy away from specialization according to comparative advantage 
and closing it off from external competition) as well as the encouragement 
of rent-seeking behavior as firms devoted resources to gaining advantages 
rather than increasing their efficiency. 
A. Heterogeneous growth outcomes and the 
reversal of fortune 
As shown in table 6 when we compare the rankings in the growth tables 
for the periods 1950-1980 and 1990-2008, a “reversal of fortune” is 
apparent: countries, such as Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, that were in the 
bottom half in the growth table in the period 1950-1980, call them the 
“losers from ISI”, tend to be in the upper half of the growth table in 
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1990-2008. And vice versa, countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Ecuador, Guatemala, the winners from 
ISI, tend to be in the bottom half of the table for the period 1990-2008. In fact there are only a few 
visible exceptions to this pattern, the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica which are in the upper half in 
both periods, and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Haiti, which are in the bottom half in both 
periods. Excluding these 4 countries, the Spearman rank correlation coefficient is –0.11. 
TABLE 6 










1 Brazil  6.6 3.8 16 1 Chile  4.8 3.6 
2 Panama 6.2 3.5 5 2 Dominican Republic 5.2 3.6 
3 Costa Rica 6.5 3.2 3 3 Costa Rica 4.7 2.9 
4 Mexico  6.2 3.2 9 4 Peru  4.5 2.8 
5 
Dominican Republi
c 5.7 2.6 18 5 Cuba 3.0 2.6 
6 Ecuador  5.5 2.6 11 6 Argentina  2.8 1.7 
7 Guatemala 5.2 2.5 7 7 Guatemala 3.7 1.6 
8 Colombia  5.1 2.2 2 8 Panama 3.4 1.6 
9 Peru  4.9 2.1 12 9 El Salvador 3.4 1.6 
10 Paraguay 4.7 2.1 13 10 Nicaragua 3.8 1.6 
11 Argentina  3.7 2.1 4 11 Mexico  3.0 1.6 
12 El Salvador 5.0 2.0 14 12 
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)  3.5 1.4 




of)  3.8 1.5 19 14 Uruguay 1.9 1.3 
15 Honduras 4.4 1.5 8 15 Colombia  2.8 1.1 




Republic of) 4.7 1.1 17 17 
Venezuela 
(Bolivarian Republic 
of) 1.9 0.3 
18 Cuba 2.5 0.6 10 18 Paraguay 2.2 -0.4 
19 Uruguay 1.4 0.4 6 19 Ecuador  1.0 -0.9 
20 Haïti 1.9 0.1 20 20 Haïti 0.2 -1.7 
 L. America* 5.3 2.6   L. America* 3.0 1.5 
 USA 3.6 2.3   USA 3.0 1.9 
Source: Angus Maddison project´s web page (2012), Historical Statistics of the World Economy: 1-2008 AD, 
http://www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm. References: Currency Unit: 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars. A: GDPpC 
Ranking 1950-1980. *Also includes Puerto Rico, Trinidad y Tobago and Jamaica. 
What accounts for differences in growth performance in that period and in the recent period? I 
will argue in this section that part of the explanation for this reversal of fortune has to do with the 
consequences of the abandonment of industrial policy. For that, we need to look at how industrial policy 
worked during the previous State-led industrialization period 
A first factor accounting for differences in growth rates and the relative success of industrial 
policy in the period of state led industrialization has to do with the size of the economy. It can not be a 
coincidence that Brazil and Mexico, the two most populous countries, were those able to sustain the 
highest rates of industrialization during the second, more difficult phase of import substitution, in which 
industrialization expanded into heavy intermediates (steel and petrochemicals) and capital goods as well 
as capital intensive consumer durables. 4 The size of their domestic markets is probably a major factor. 
For it allowed industrial sectors with high fixed costs (associated to their capital intensity), and as a 
                                                        
4  As shown in table 6, Mexico is second only to Brazil in the rate of expansion of GDP although it is tied in fourth place behind 
Panama and Ecuador in terms of growth of output per capita. 
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result strong economies of scale, to be established while it attracted the foreign investment required to 
set up these capital and technology intensive industries. In other countries, the opportunities for import 
substitution were concentrated in light consumer goods and intermediate goods with low capital and 
technology intensity and attempts to go into the “difficult phase” could result in highly inefficient 
industrial sectors. In the case of the Southern cone economies with a relatively high degree of 
industrialization in 1950, the opportunities for easy import substitution were non-existent or disappeared 
very soon (given, precisely, their relatively advanced industrial sectors).  
A second factor affecting the efficiency of industrialization policies has to do with the nature of the 
domestic economy. Diaz Alejandro (1988) highlights this factor in his comparison of the economic 
histories of Argentina and Brazil. Brazil was a dualistic economy, a Lewis-type economy. In Arthur Lewis’ 
model of economic development there is a surplus of labor which generates an elastic supply of labor to the 
modern sector of the economy. This was important for the process of reallocation of labor in Brazil. The 
expansion of the industrial sector meant that the process of industrialization caused labor to move from low 
productivity sectors to high productivity sectors (from the “subsistence” to the industrial sector). These 
productivity gains were behind the rapid increases in GDP per worker and per capita. Argentina, by 
contrast, was a mature economy in which most sectors were modern and there was not a large subsistence 
sector. Productivity levels were similar across economic activities. This meant that the economy couldn’t 
benefit from the reallocation of labor from low to high productivity sectors. Rather, the expansion of the 
industrial sector caused labor to be taken away from the modern export sector. Because industrialization 
crowded out labor in the export sector, the anti-export bias was higher in Argentina. 
A third factor refers to the role of export promotion policies and exchange rate policy and how 
successful was the transition to the “mixed model” of import substitution cum export promotion. It is 
worth noting that four of the fast growing economies are among the six that started experimenting with 
export promotion policies sometime in the 1960s or early 1970s (Bulmer-Thomas, 2003) and the two 
with crawling pegs (Colombia and Brazil). That is, all of the slow growing economies with only 2 
exceptions were not early adopters of export-promotion policies. In the case of the countries with large 
domestic markets (Brazil, Mexico, and to a lesser extent Colombia) the success of export promotion 
policies was facilitated by the smaller anti-export bias generated by the protection of intermediate and 
capital goods (to the extent that required tariffs were smaller). All this suggests a role in growth 
outcomes for the type of industrialization policy adopted. 
It is not a coincidence that Brazil and Mexico, the only two countries to share these three features 
(large size, labor surpluses and export promotion policy) are precisely the two countries at the top of the 
growth table (see table 6). 5 It is these countries that benefited most from the productivity gains 
associated with the reallocation of labor towards the industrial sector and modern services. And I think 
this is the explanation for why the dismantling of industrial policy has harmed these two countries the 
most. In the period 1990-2008, they are clearly in the bottom half of the growth table. 
This is part but not all the explanation for the “reversal of fortune” that characterizes the recent 
period since 1990 in comparison to the period 1950-1980. It turns out, as shown in table 7, that the most 
prosperous economies since 1990 are those that have specialized in natural resource intensive products 
taking advantage of their static comparative advantage given by their abundance of natural resources. 
Table 7 ranks countries according to net primary exports as a percentage of GDP, a frequently used 
indicator of abundance in natural resources (see for example Sachs and Warner, 2001). The association 
between abundance and natural resources and growth since 1990 is remarkable. These resource rich 
 
                                                        
5  Note that the rankings in table 6 differ from those in table 5 which uses the more appropriate concept for growth comparisons of 
GDP per person employed. Data for this is only available from 1980. 
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 economies were the ones able to compensate the employment and output losses in manufacturing 
industries, an option that was not available to countries that were poorer in natural resources. There 
were, of course, exceptions such as the Dominican Republic a country whose comparatives advantages 
are assembly of manufactures and tourism given by its location advantage.  
TABLE 7 
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: NATURAL RESOURCE ABUNDANCE  
AND GROWTH, 1990-2008 
Country Net exports of 
primary goods 2009 a 
Growth rate 
1990-2008 b 
Chile 29 2.3 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 27 0.6 
Ecuador 24 -0.1 
Honduras 22 1.5 
Nicaragua 20 2.1 
Paraguay 20 -0.1 
Peru 18 2.9 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 17 -0.2 
Uruguay 13 2.2 
Argentina 12 1.7 
Guatemala 11 0.8 
Colombia 10 1.0 
Costa Rica 8 1.1 
Mexico 6 0.6 
Brazil 6 1.0 
El Salvador 5 2.7 
Panama 4 2.8 
Dominican Republic. 3 2.9 
a     Net exports of primary goods as % of GDP (WDI) 
 b     Growth rate of GDP per person employed (WDI) 
The information for Cuba and Haiti was not available. GDP per capita 
italics. 
The dismantlement of industrial policy was thus a big mistake. The best industrial policy, at least 
in the larger and poorer economies in natural resources, is not “not to have an industrial policy”. 
B. Appreciating real exchange rates, falling industrial 
profitability and deindustrialization 
Another big mistake has been to let real exchange rates appreciate rather than compensating trade 
liberalization and the dismantling of industrial policy with a relatively undervalued real exchange. This 
has meant that the region has been recurrently infected by the Dutch disease (appreciation caused by 
booms of natural resource intensive exports) and by the Mexican disease (appreciation caused by 
massive capital inflows). 
Let us look at the Dutch disease in recent periods. The fast growing countries included in table 8 
are either those rich in natural resources (Chile, Peru and Uruguay) or those which avoided a dramatic 
process of deindustrialization (Dominican Republic, Panama, and El Salvador). 
In the case of the natural resource rich countries, the dynamism of the Chinese economy and of 
the world demand for raw materials have had so far favorable short term effects on economic growth 
(see Ros, 2012). The medium and longer-term developmental consequences of the raw materials export 
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boom will depend, however, on its effects on real exchange rates and the profitability of the non 
resource intensive tradable goods sectors, that is on whether a Dutch disease is developing in the region. 
As shown in graph 3, the raw materials export boom has been accompanied by a substantial appreciation 
of real exchange rates in Latin America sometime after the beginning of the past decade, only briefly 
interrupted by the temporary depreciations that took place in 2008 an early 2009 as a consequence of the 
international financial crisis, the “flight to quality”, and the increase in risk spreads in emerging markets. 
TABLE 8 
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: SHARE OF MANUFACTURING  
IN GDP (%), 1990-2010 a 
Country 1990 2010 b Change 
Uruguay 28.0 15.0 -13.0 
Brazil c 27.4 15.8 -11.6 
Chile 19.6 11.5 -8.1 
Argentina 26.8 20.5 -6.3 
Colombia 20.6 15.1 -5.5 
Costa Rica 22.6 17.4 -5.2 
Bolivia ((Plurinational State of) 18.5 13.9 -4.6 
Paraguay 16.8 12.2 -4.6 
Panama 9.7 6.1 -3.6 
Mexico 20.8 18.1 -2.7 
El Salvador 22.1 20.6 -1.5 
Peru 17.8 16.6 -1.2 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 14.9 14.7 -0.2 
Cuba 7.7 9.6 1.9 
Honduras 16.3 18.4 2.1 
Dominican Republic 18.0 24.1 6.1 
Median 19.0 15.8 -3.2 
Mean 19.2 15.7 -3.5 
Source: WDI, World Bank. 
a     Manufacturing value added as percentage of gross value added at factor cost.  
b     2010 or last available data.  c Average of 1989 and 1991. 
GRAPH 3 
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: REAL EXCHANGE RATES IN SEVERAL  
SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES, 1990-2010 
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Graph 4 assesses the extent of appreciation by comparing the level of the real exchange rate in 
2010 with its average level for the period 2002-2008 and the minimum level (i.e., the most appreciated 
level) in the 1990s. With the exception of Argentina, real exchange rates in 2010 were similar or lower 
than the minimum levels of the 1990s and well below (including Argentina) the average levels of 2002-
2008. The primary exports boom has led to a decline the profitability of the industrial sector. As shown 
in figure 5, in several of South American countries, unit labor costs in dollars tended to increase after 
2002-2003 in a substantial and sustained way suggesting that, at least for the labor intensive tradable 
goods sectors, there is an important problem of competitiveness and profitability. 
GRAPH 4 
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: REAL EXCHANGE RATES IN SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES.  
MINIMUM LEVEL OF THE 1990's, AVERAGE OF 2002-2008 AND 2010 
 
Source: Frenkel and Rapetti (2011). Bilateral rates vis a vis the United States (100 = 2000). 
GRAPH 5 
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: UNIT LABOUR COSTS IN US DOLLARS  
SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES (2000 = 100) 
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C.  Can macroeconomic policy be a substitute for industrial 
policy? 
The relationship between the real exchange rate and the rate of economic growth has been receiving a 
great deal of attention in recent times after the extraordinarily high growth rates achieved by countries 
that have deliberately undervalued their real exchange rates (this is the case of China) and the slow 
growth rates experienced by a large number of countries with overvalued exchange rates. In the absence 
of an industrial policy, and given the current institutional weakness to implement such a policy, can 
macroeconomic policy be a good substitute?  
As noted by Kaldor and others, a high real exchange rate is equivalent to a tariff on imports and 
an export subsidy. Both of these, tariff and subsidy, benefit the tradable goods sectors, manufacturing 
being the largest of them in most countries. To counteract the adverse developmental effects of the 
Dutch and Mexican diseases and in this way act as a partial substitute for industrial policy, 
macroeconomic policy must fulfill certain requirements.  
Since the adverse effects of those diseases arise mostly from the real exchange appreciation that 
accompanies the expansion of primary exports or the massive capital inflows and its crowding out 
effects on non resource based tradable sectors, exchange rate policy has a crucial role to play in 
neutralizing these effects. If this is so, the inflation targeting regimes currently fashionable in Latin 
America are not well prepared for the task of addressing those adverse developmental consequences. In 
fact, under this regime there seems to be a built in bias towards the appreciation of the exchange rate. 
Graph 6 shows the evolution of real exchange rates in Latin America in 3 groups of countries according 
to monetary policy regime (inflation targeting cum floating exchange rates, dollarized regimes, and 
others). As shown in the figure, the trend towards real appreciation in the period 2002-2008 was much 
more marked in countries with inflation targeting regimes was in the other two groups of countries. 
GRAPH 6 
REAL EXCHANGE RATES IN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
ACCORDING TO MONETARY POLICY REGIME, 2002-2008 
 
Source: Ize (2008). 
This built in bias towards appreciation may be due to various reasons. First, under inflation 
targeting (especially in its “strict form”) monetary policy focuses on achieving low inflation using the 
interest rate as the main policy instrument while ignoring other policy objectives such as employment 
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that of the impact of the interest rate operating on interest sensitive components of aggregate demand, as 
argued below), it becomes in these conditions very tempting for central banks to subordinate the 
exchange rate to their inflation objectives or to respond in a non symmetrical way to appreciations and 
depreciations. 6 Second, due to the shallowness of credit markets in developing countries the sensitivity 
of aggregate demand to interest movements is low and therefore central banks may need to raise interest 
rates excessively to achieve the inflation target. High interest rates then attract capital inflows which 
tend to appreciate the domestic currency.  
Freeing monetary policy from the straight jacket of inflation targeting is thus a precondition for 
targeting the exchange rate. This may require the use of sterilized interventions in the foreign exchange 
market and the adoption of capital account regulations. However, these policies face limitations as 
sterilization may run into significant quasi-fiscal costs and capital inflows may find ways to circumvent 
regulations. Moreover, financial integration implies that when exchange rate policy is trying to pursue a 
real exchange rate target, monetary policy is no longer completely autonomous. In addition, while 
exchange rate management can affect closely the absolute price of tradable goods it faces more 
difficulties when it comes to affect the relative price of tradables vis a vis non-tradables and labor. If 
instead of generating a real depreciation, nominal devaluations led to rises in domestic prices, the 
devaluation-inflation spiral resulting from engaging in further devaluations can have deleterious effects 
on capital accumulation and growth.  
All this means that the job of counteracting the Dutch and Mexican diseases requires not only 
giving monetary policy a greater room for maneuver in order to target the exchange rate but also policy 
coordination through the help, in particular, of fiscal policy and wage management policies. Indeed, 
fiscal policy may have to play a more preponderant role in managing domestic aggregate demand and in 
restraining, in particular, inflationary pressures in the non-tradable goods sectors (see, on the subject, 
Eichengreen, 2007; Frenkel, 2008; and Rapetti, 2011). Since part of the real appreciation associated to 
the Dutch disease arises from the spending out of natural resource rents on non tradable goods and 
services, or, in the case of the Mexican disease, from the expansion of credit resulting from massive 
capital inflows, counteracting this may require an increase in the fiscal surplus in order to moderate the 
pace of non-tradable demand growth. The required increase in the fiscal surplus can be generated 
through tariffs or taxes on the primary exports which are at the origin of the Dutch disease (see, on the 
subject, Bresser-Pereira, 2008 and 2011). 
Wage management policies that coordinate the pace of real wage increases with the rate of 
productivity growth in the tradable goods sector can also help in restraining inflationary pressures in 
non-tradable goods prices and in containing the growth of unit labor costs, thus preventing the fall in 
profitability and capital accumulation in non resource intensive tradable goods sectors. As argued in Ros 
(2011), while a higher real exchange rate implies that in the short run real wages are lower than 
otherwise, it will nevertheless lead to higher real consumption wages in long run equilibrium as a result 
of the endogenous productivity growth effects of capital accumulation in the tradable goods sectors and 
of the absorption of employment from non tradable goods sectors. The mechanisms connecting an 
initially higher real exchange rate and a higher value of the real wage in the steady state are the presence 
of increasing returns to scale in the tradable goods sector and of diminishing returns to labor in the non 
tradable goods activities. 
                                                        
6  The so called “fear of floating” may also contribute to this non symmetrical response and to a pro-cyclical management of interest 
rates. For a critical discussion of the suitability of inflation targeting for developing countries, see Epstein and Yeldan (2009) and 
Rapetti (2011). On the non symmetrical response of monetary policy to exchange rate shocks in the Mexican case, see Galindo and 
Ros (2008), and in the case of Brazil, see Barbosa-Filho (2008). 
CEPAL - Serie Estudios y perspectivas - México - N° 139 Institutional and policy convergence with growth divergence in… 
23 
References 
Barbosa-Filho, Nelson (2008), “Inflation Targeting in Brazil: 1999-2006”, 
International Review of Applied Economics, vol. 22, N° 2, pp. 187-200. 
Bresser-Pereira, L. C. (2008), “Dutch disease and its neutralization: a Ricardian 
approach”, Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 28 (1): 47–71. 
______ (2011), “From old to new developmentalism”, in J. A. Ocampo and J. 
Ros (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Latin American Economics, Oxford 
University Press. 
Eichengreen, B. (2007), “The real exchange rate and economic growth, 
Commission on Growth and Development, Working Paper No 4. 
Epstein, G. and E. Yeldan (2009), “Beyond inflation targeting: Assessing the 
impacts and policy alternatives”, Edward Elgar Publishing. 
ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) (2008), 
“The competitive real exchange-rate regime, inflation and monetary policy”, 
Roberto Frenkel, Cepal Review 96, vol. 96, pp. 191-201, December. 
    Frenkel, R. y M. Rapetti (2011), “La principal amenaza de América Latina en la
      próxima década: ¿Fragilidad externa o primarización? 
Galindo, L. M. and J. Ros (2008), “Alternatives to inflation targeting in 
Mexico”, International Review of Applied Economics, vol. 22, issue 2. 
Ize, A. (2008), “From tail winds to head winds: Dilemmas and trade-offs for 
monetary policy in Latin America and the Caribbean,” ppt presentation, 
Lima, Peru, 16 June. 
Lora, Eduardo y Carmen Pagés (1996), “Legislación laboral en el proceso de 
reformas estructurales de América Latina y el Caribe”, IDB. 
Przeworski, Adam (2004), “Democracy and Economic Development”, in 
Edward D. Mansfield and Richard Sisson (eds.), The Evolution of 
Political Knowledge. Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 
Ros, J. (2011), “The real exchange rate, the real wage and growth, 
unpublished, UNAM. 
  
CEPAL - Serie Estudios y perspectivas - México - N° 139 Institutional and policy convergence with growth divergence in… 
24 
Sachs, J. and A. Warner (2001), “The curse of natural resources”, European Economic Review, 45: 827-838.  
Vega, María (2005), “La reforma laboral en América Latina: 15 años después. Un análisis comparado”, Lima: 
OIT, Oficina Regional para América Latina y el Caribe. 




CEPAL - Serie Estudios y perspectivas - México - N° 139 Institutional and policy convergence with growth divergence in… 
27 
TABLE A-1 
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: TRADE POLICY CHANGES:  
AVERAGE TARIFF, 1985 AND 2010 (%) a 
Country 1985 2010 
Argentina 28 6




Costa Rica 53  2a
Cuba 6
Dominican Republic 88b 5c
Ecuador 50 6










Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 30 11
Source: Lora (2001), World Development Indicators. 
Notes: a/ Weighted mean to all products (%). a) 2009: b) 1988; 
c) 2008; d) 1986; e) 1993, f) 1989, and g) 1997. 
TABLE A-2 
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: FOREIGN TRADE  
AS % OF GDP, 1980 AND 2008 
Country 1980 2008 
Argentina 11.5 45.1




Costa Rica 56.9 100.8
Cuba 62.8 44.9
Dominican Republic 78.8 64.7
Ecuador 50.8 75.5










Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 52.2 51.8
Average 58.8 74.3
Source: PWT. Openness at 2005 constant prices (%). 
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TABLE A-3 
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: FDI AS % OF GROSS FOXED CAPITAL  
FORMATION, 1980 AND 2009 
Country 1980 2009 
Argentina 4 6 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 12 15 
Brazil 4 10 
Chile 4 37 
Colombia 2 13 
Costa Rica 4 22 
Cuba 0 0 
Dominican Republic 6 32 
Ecuador 3 3 
El Salvador 4 13 
Guatemala 8 12 
Haiti 5 5 
Honduras 1 15 
Mexico 4 8 
Nicaragua 6 22 
Panama a/ 30 30 
Paraguay 3 8 
Peru 1 19 
Uruguay 12 26 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 0 -4 
Source: UNCTADSTAT.  
Note: a/ 1981. 
TABLE A-4  
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: TYPE OF POLITICAL REGIME AND POPULATION  
BY COUNTRY 1980 AND 2009 
Country Authoritarian regime 1980 






Mexico Yes 68,347 No   111,212 
Chile Yes 11,094 No 16,602 
Argentina Yes 28,370 No 40,914 
Cuba Yes 9,653 Yes 11,110 
Costa Rica No 2,299 No 4,455 
Uruguay Yes 2,930 No 3,294 
Panama Yes 1,960 No 3,360 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) No 14,768 No 27,191 
Colombia No 26,631 No 43,677 
Brazil Yes 123,020 No 198,739 
El Salvador Yes 4,566 No 6,031 
Peru Yes 17,295 No 28,647 
Guatemala Yes 6,650 No 13,277 
Ecuador No 7,920 No 14,573 
Honduras Yes 3,402 No 7,834 
Paraguay Yes 3,196 No 6,291 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) Yes 5,441 No 9,775 
Nicaragua Yes 2,806 No 5,541 
Haiti Yes 5,200 No 9,778 
 Latin American population living under an Latin American population living 
 85.1% 2.0% 
Source: Prepared by the author with information from  Heston, Alan; Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, "Penn World Table 
Version 7.0," Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, May 
2011. 
Note: To determine if the political regime was a democratic or an authoritarian one the criteria of Przeworski (2004) was 
followed. 
The sum of the population of the 19 countries was considered as the total population of Latin.  
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